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2315 
Inverse Condemnation Actions Present Unique 
Problems When Determining “Just Compensation” 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of eminent domain has existed for centuries;1 “[t]he 
first formal declaration of the related just compensation principle 
occurred in France’s 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen.”2 Today, the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution 
requires just compensation.3  
In order to determine just compensation, a court must first 
decide the date from which the taken property will be valued (“date 
of valuation”).4 There are many different methods that courts 
employ when determining the date of valuation in inverse 
condemnation actions. Some courts look to the date of possession 
while others look to a much later date.  
Having different methods for determining a date of valuation 
creates perverse incentives for both condemnors and condemnees. 
Improper valuation dates create perverse incentives because, 
depending on what the real estate market is doing, either party can 
manipulate the system, or lack thereof, in order to achieve an unjust 
result. If property values are depreciating, then using a date of 
valuation that comes after the date of taking unfairly penalizes the 
condemnee.5 Conversely, if property values are appreciating, then 
using a date of valuation subsequent to the date of taking unfairly 
penalizes the condemnor.6 In addition to the date of valuation 
                                                                                                           
 1.  See Christopher Bauer, Comment, Government Takings and Constitutional 
Guarantees: When Date of Valuation Statutes Deny Just Compensation, 2003 BYU L. REV. 265, 
268–69. 
 2.  Id. at 269. The declaration reads: “[P]roperty being inviolable and sacred, no one 
ought to be deprived of it, except in cases of evident public necessity, legally ascertained, and 
on condition of a previous just indemnity.” THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND 
OF THE CITIZEN § XVII (Fr. 1789) (emphasis added). 
 3.  U.S. CONST. amend. V (reads in pertinent part: “nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation”). 
 4.  Bauer, supra note 1, at 274. 
 5. Dep’t of Transp. v. Shaw, 345 N.E.2d 153, 161 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976). 
 6.  Id. 
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problem, the date that courts decide when interest begins to accrue 
is also important when determining just compensation.7 
There is no literature that describes the problems that courts face 
when determining just compensation in inverse condemnation 
actions. This Comment discusses those problems and proposes 
workable solutions.  
Part II of this Comment discusses the various methods used to 
determine the date of valuation in inverse condemnation actions and 
concludes by proposing a consistent solution. There are three 
methods that courts typically use to determine the date of valuation 
in inverse condemnation actions. The first method uses the date of 
possession or trespass as the date of valuation, the second method 
uses the date of trial, and the third method uses the date that the 
condemnor’s actions substantially affected the landowner’s use and 
enjoyment of his property. These methods all have their 
shortcomings and cannot produce just results in all cases. 
Nevertheless, a valuation date produces the most just results when 
the property is valued at the time of taking because compensation is 
required when the property is taken. When the condemnor takes 
property by physical occupation or trespass, the property should be 
valued from the date of occupation. When the condemnor takes 
property due to its substantial interference, the property should be 
valued from the date that the interference became a taking.  
Part III of this Comment discusses the methods that courts use 
in determining the date that interest begins to accrue. Courts use 
various methods for determining the date that interest accrues in an 
inverse condemnation action. The most just method is to set the 
date that interest accrues, the date of taking, and the date of 
valuation as the same date. 
II. METHODS OF DETERMINING THE DATE OF VALUATION 
Broadly speaking, there are two types of eminent domain actions. 
They are commonly referred to as direct condemnation actions and 
inverse condemnation actions. Direct condemnation actions occur 
when the condemnor8 initiates a condemnation action before taking 
property.9 Inverse condemnation actions are “[a]ctions brought by 
                                                                                                           
 7.  Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 9–11 (1984). 
 8.  For the purposes of this Comment, “condemnor” means both government entities 
and private entities who are vested with the taking power. 
 9. See generally Kirby Forest Indus., 467 U.S. at 3–5. A direct condemnation action is 
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landowners alleging that a taking of their property has resulted from 
activities of the public agencies or private bodies vested with 
authority to condemn.”10 
Furthermore, there are three different types of inverse 
condemnation actions. The first type is when a condemnor physically 
invades or trespasses on private property without bringing 
condemnation proceedings, and the property owner is forced to 
bring the condemnation action.11 The second type happens when 
“the landowner’s land has been taken and the action is brought to 
recover damages to the land not taken that the property owner 
alleges have not been compensated in the original and formal 
eminent domain proceeding.”12 And the third type happens “when 
no land has been formally and physically taken by the condemning 
authority, but the property owner alleges that he has suffered 
compensable damages resulting from the taking of certain of the 
bundle of property rights comprising his ownership.”13 
Constitutionally, just compensation requires that “the property 
owner [be put] in as good a position as he or she would have 
occupied if the taking had not occurred.”14 The just compensation 
requirement protects not only the property owner, but also the 
condemnor.15 The idea that just compensation also protects the 
condemnor has been discussed in both federal and state courts.16 For 
                                                                                                           
also known as a “straight-condemnation” action. Id. at 3. 
 10. ROBERT R. WRIGHT & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE IN A NUTSHELL 160 (4th 
ed. 2000); see also Thompson v. Tualatin Hills Park & Recreation Dist., 496 F. Supp. 530, 539 
(D. Or. 1980) (“The term ‘inverse condemnation’ is used to describe a cause of action against 
a governmental entity to recover the value of property taken by the entity even though no 
formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been completed.”). 
 11.  See, e.g., Calmat of Ariz. v. State ex rel. Miller, 859 P.2d 1323, 1324–26 (Ariz. 
1993). 
 12.  Dep’t of Transp. v. Shaw, 345 N.E.2d 153, 160 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 369 N.E.2d 884 (Ill. 1977). 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Bauer, supra note 1, at 273. See, e.g., Kirby Forest Indus., Inc., 467 U.S. at 10; 
Lange v. State, 547 P.2d 282, 285 (Wash. 1976) (“It is well established that the condemnee is 
entitled to be put in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied had his property 
not been taken.”). 
 15.  See 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.06[2] (“Ordinarily compensation should 
be just to the condemnor as well as to the condemnee.”). 
 16.  See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 516 (1979) (“The 
guiding principle of just compensation . . . is that the owner of the condemned property ‘must 
be made whole but is not entitled to more.’” (emphasis added to last six words) (quoting Olson 
v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934))); United States v. L.E. Cooke Co., 991 F.2d 
336, 341 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[O]vercompensation is as unjust to the public as 
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example, the California Court of Appeal noted that “the 
constitutional requirement for the payment of ‘just compensation’ is 
not only for the benefit of the landowner, but also for the benefit of 
the public.”17  
In order to determine just compensation, courts must first 
determine the valuation date of the taking.18 Some states set the 
valuation date by statute.19 It is crucial that, when determining just 
compensation, courts first determine the date of valuation because 
land values can change over time.20  
Inverse condemnation actions present unique problems when 
determining just compensation. In a direct condemnation action, the 
taking is usually close to the trial date; therefore, it is easier to 
determine a valuation date that is just. In inverse condemnation 
actions, however, the taking may or may not be close to the trial 
date. This can create problems for courts as they try to determine 
what valuation date will produce a just compensation award. 
Courts use various methods when determining the date of 
valuation in inverse condemnation actions. The three most common 
methods used are: (1) the date that the condemnor unlawfully 
possessed or trespassed on the landowner’s land; (2) the date of trial, 
date of summons, or date of judgment (collectively referred to as 
“the date of trial”); and (3) the date that the condemnor’s actions 
substantially affected the landowner’s use and enjoyment of his 
property.21 All of these methods, by themselves, render unjust results 
because they either fail to foresee actions that have no physical 
invasion, or the valuation date is not close to the date of taking. The 
solution is to have a date of valuation rule that fixes those problems. 
                                                                                                           
undercompensation is to the property owner . . . .”); City of Fresno v. Cloud, 26 Cal. App. 3d 
113, 123 (1972).  
 17. City of Fresno, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 123. 
 18.  Bauer, supra note 1, at 274 (“[B]efore a condemnor can award just compensation, 
it must properly determine the compensation amount, which requires setting a date of 
valuation.”); see also Mount Laurel Twp. v. Stanley, 885 A.2d 440, 441 (N.J. 2005) (“One of 
the key components in determining what constitutes just compensation in exchange for an 
eminent domain taking is the date of valuation of the private property subject to 
condemnation.”). 
 19.  Bauer, supra note 1, at 274. 
 20.  Calmat of Ariz. v. State ex rel. Miller, 859 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ariz. 1993) (“Timing 
is critical to valuation because it affects the fairness of the compensation when property values 
fluctuate between the date of the condemnor’s entry and the summons’ date.”). 
 21.  See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 258 (1980); Hayden v. Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs, 580 P.2d 830, 834 (Colo. App. 1978); Twp. of W. Windsor v. Nierenberg, 695 
A.2d 1344 (N.J. 1997).  
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A. Using the Date of Physical Occupation or Trespass as the Date of 
Valuation 
Usually, “[w]hen a taking occurs by physical invasion,” courts 
use the method that values the property on the date that the 
condemnor unlawfully possessed or trespassed on the property 
owner’s land. 22  
1. The date of physical occupation or trespass method 
The United States Supreme Court held that “[w]here 
Government physically occupies land without condemnation 
proceedings, ‘the owner has a right to bring an “inverse 
condemnation” suit to recover the value of the land on the date of the 
intrusion by the Government.’”23 
This approach to determining the date of valuation in inverse 
condemnation actions has been followed in several states.24 For 
example, the Arizona Supreme Court followed this approach in 
Calmat of Arizona v. State ex rel. Miller.25 In Calmat, the State filed 
a condemnation action on October 11, 1985, against Calmat for the 
purpose of expanding a bridge on Calmat’s land.26 However, the 
state “took no further action to bring the case to trial”27 and in 
November 1986 “the condemnation action was dismissed for failure 
to prosecute.”28 In December 1985, however, “the state posted a 
bond, obtained an order of immediate possession, and erected 
permanent structures on the property.”29 As a result, Calmat, the 
private property owner, filed an inverse condemnation action against 
                                                                                                           
 22.  Clarke, 445 U.S. at 258 (noting that “[w]hen a taking occurs by physical invasion . 
. . the usual rule is that the time of the invasion constitutes the act of taking, and ‘[i]t is that 
event which gives rise to the claim for compensation and fixes the date as of which the land is 
to be valued’” (quoting United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 22 (1958)). 
 23.  First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 
304, 320 n.10 (1987) (quoting Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 5 
(1984)). 
 24.  See, e.g., Calmat, 859 P.2d at 1324–1328; State Highway Comm’n v. Stumbo, 352 
P.2d 478, 484 (Or. 1960); Maxey v. Redevelopment Auth. of Racine, 288 N.W.2d 794, 805 
(Wis. 1980). 
 25.  See 859 P.2d at 1323. 
 26. Id. at 1324. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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the state in June 1987.30 Relying on an Arizona statute,31 Calmat 
argued “that the property should be valued as of the summons’ date 
in the inverse condemnation action.”32 The trial court, over the 
state’s objection,33 held that the statute applied to inverse 
condemnation actions, and the date of valuation was set as the 
summons’ date in the inverse condemnation action.34 After the jury 
returned a rather large verdict for Calmat, the trial court questioned 
its own ruling on the date of valuation.35 The trial court judge stated, 
“[h]aving now seen the evidence, and now having a better sense of 
the extent of the windfall [to Calmat], the Court has serious doubts 
about the correctness and the justness of [using the date of 
summons’ as the] valuation date.”36 Consequently, the court granted 
a new trial to the state and Calmat appealed.37 The appellate court 
held that the trial court’s initial ruling as to the valuation date was 
correct, “and that the trial court had erroneously granted the state’s 
motion for a new trial.”38  
The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed and found that the 
proper valuation date should be the date of the state’s original 
entry.39 Even though, up to this point, the Arizona Supreme Court 
had held that other aspects of the eminent domain statutes were 
applicable to inverse condemnation actions, the court held that it 
was improper to apply the date of valuation statute to inverse 
condemnation actions.40 The court found that the Arizona statute 
fulfilled the purpose of just compensation “in a direct condemnation 
action because the property is valued at a point close in time to the 
                                                                                                           
 30.  Id. 
 31.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1123(A) (2009) (“For the purpose of assessing 
compensation and damages [in regards to condemnation actions], the right to compensation 
and damages shall be deemed to accrue at the date of the summons, and its actual value at that 
date shall be the measure of compensation and damages.”). 
 32.  Calmat, 859 P.2d at 1324. 
 33.  Id. (“The state argued that § 12-1123(A) was a direct condemnation statute and did 
not apply to an inverse condemnation action.”). 
 34.  Id. at 1324–25. The difference in the date of entry that the state was arguing for 
and the date of summons in the inverse condemnation suit was eighteen months. Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 1325. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id. at 1326–28. 
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actual taking.”41 However, the court found that, due to the timing 
differences in direct and inverse condemnation actions, the statute 
did not fulfill the purpose of just compensation in inverse 
condemnation actions.42 The court explained that “[t]iming is 
critical to valuation because it affects the fairness of the 
compensation when property values fluctuate between the date of 
the condemnor’s entry and the summons’ date.”43 The court went 
on to explain how, if the court applied the date-of-valuation statute 
as written, “the property owner [would] either be over- or under-
compensated, depending on whether the value of the property 
increases or decreases between the date of entry and the later 
summons’ date.”44 The court then held that “[b]ecause the taking of 
possession constitutes a ‘taking’ of property, . . . the date of 
valuation in an inverse condemnation action should be set as of the 
date of entry.”45 
2. The date-of-possession or date-of-trespass method is inadequate for 
determining the date of valuation 
There are two major inadequacies to using the date-of-possession 
or date-of-trespass method in inverse condemnation proceedings. 
The first inadequacy is that not all inverse condemnation actions 
involve a physical invasion—some are regulatory takings.46 The 
second inadequacy is that this method, by itself, does not deter a 
potential condemnor from acting in bad faith.47 
First, using the date of physical occupation or trespass does not 
account for inverse condemnation actions that do not involve 
physical invasions. While this method may or may not be applicable 
                                                                                                           
 41. Id. at 1326. 
 42.  Id. The court explains that using the date of summons, as the Arizona statute 
directs, is logical in a direct condemnation action because it “fairly . . . represent[s] the date of 
taking.” Id. at 1327 (quoting Maxey v. Redevelopment. Auth., 288 N.W.2d 794, 804 (Wis. 
1980)). The court went on to explain that “the summons’ date in an inverse condemnation 
action bears no relation to the date of the taking. When an inverse condemnation action is 
filed, the condemning agency, by definition, has already taken the condemnee’s property.” Id.   
 43. Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 1328. 
 46.  See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992); Pa. Coal Co. 
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); Dep’t of Transp. v. Shaw, 345 N.E.2d 153, 160 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1976), rev’d in part on other grounds, 369 N.E.2d 884 (Ill. 1977).  
 47.  Determining the date that interest begins at the time of entry can minimize this 
shortcoming.  
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to the second type of inverse condemnation action,48 it is definitely 
not applicable to the third type, because in that instance there is no 
physical occupation or trespass.49 A good date-of-valuation rule or 
statute should account for the various types of inverse condemnation 
actions in order to ensure consistency.  
Second, using the date-of-physical-occupation or date-of-trespass 
test does not deter potential condemnors from acting in bad faith. 
Consider the following hypothetical: Blue Village wants to expand its 
sewer system. It buries its pipe in an unimproved desert area that 
Blue Village assumes no one will care about or notice. Five years 
later, the owners of the unimproved desert attempt to develop their 
land, and find out that they cannot because there is a sewer line 
running across their property. The property owners then file an 
inverse condemnation action. If the court used the date-of-physical 
occupation or date-of-trespass test, then the property owners would 
be stuck with an early valuation date that may or may not be just for 
them, depending on property values, and Blue Village would get the 
benefit from either acting in bad faith (by knowingly burying a sewer 
line on someone else’s land) or failing to perform due diligence. 
Additionally, condemnors have greater incentives to take property in 
bad faith because property owners are unable to get punitive 
damages in a condemnation action.50  
Using the date-of-physical occupation or date-of-trespass as the 
date of valuation in inverse condemnation actions is inappropriate 
because it does not account for situations where there is no physical 
occupation or trespass, and it inadequately deters condemnors from 
acting in bad faith.  
                                                                                                           
 48.  The second type is when “part of the landowner’s land has been taken and the 
action is brought to recover damages to the land not taken that the property owner alleges 
have not been compensated in the original and formal eminent domain proceeding.” Shaw, 
345 N.E.2d at 160. 
 49.  The third type is “when no land has been formally and physically taken by the 
condemnation authority, but the property owner alleges that he has suffered compensable 
damages resulting from the taking of certain of the bundle of property rights comprising his 
ownership.” Id.  
 50.  See, e.g., Clemmer v. Rowan Water, Inc., No 0:04CV165(HRW), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6965, at *17 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 23, 2006) (finding that a property owner could not seek 
punitive damages in an inverse condemnation action because “punitive damage claims are 
precluded by the doctrine of reverse condemnation”). 
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B. Using the Date of Trial as the Date of Valuation 
There are numerous states that do not use the date of possession 
or trespass as the date of valuation.51 Instead some jurisdictions use 
the date of trial as the date of valuation. Courts tend to rely on three 
different rationales when determining that a date of valuation should 
be set as the date of trial. The first rationale is simply to apply a date-
of-valuation statute, which statute clearly only contemplates direct 
condemnation actions, to the inverse condemnation action. The 
second rationale focuses on the fault of the parties. The third rational 
argues that since a lawful taking does not take place until trial, the 
valuation of the property should be determined at the time of taking. 
1. Applying the direct-condemnation-date-of-valuation statute 
Just over half of the states have date-of-valuation statutes.52 Some 
of those states have held that those statutes apply in inverse 
condemnation actions as well as direct condemnation actions.53 For 
example, in Hayden v. Board of County Commissioners, the Colorado 
Court of Appeals found that the date of valuation in an inverse 
condemnation action was the date of trial.54 In Hayden, the plaintiffs 
had granted a temporary easement to the State in order to complete 
a highway project.55 The plaintiffs had expressed “a willingness to 
grant a permanent right-of-way” if the county would commit to 
extend a different road.56 Apparently, the county never committed to 
the road extension, and the State presumably remained on the 
temporary easement because the plaintiffs filed an inverse 
                                                                                                           
 51.  See, e.g., Mehl v. People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 532 P.2d 489, 495 (Cal. 
1975); Hayden v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 580 P.2d 830, 834 (Colo. App. 1978); Cnty. of 
Clark v. Alper, 685 P.2d 943, 949 (Nev. 1984); Williams v. Henderson Cnty. Levee Dist. No. 
3, 59 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1933). 
 52. Bauer, supra note 1, at 278 (stating that “twenty-nine states have a valuation date 
statute of some kind”). 
 53.  See, e.g., Hayden, 580 P.2d at 834; Alper, 685 P.2d at 949. The court held that 
Nevada’s date-of-valuation statute applied to an inverse condemnation action that set the date 
of valuation as the date of trial. Alper, 685 P.2d at 949. The court also found that “[i]nverse 
condemnation proceedings are the constitutional equivalent to eminent domain actions and 
are governed by the same rules and principles that are applied to formal condemnation 
proceedings.” Id. 
 54. 580 P.2d at 834. 
 55.  Id. at 832. The easement was granted in January 1968 and was to end no later than 
January 1969. Id. 
 56.  Id.  
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condemnation action in 1974.57 In December 1975, the trial court 
“found that a taking had occurred.”58 The trial court also found that 
that the date of valuation was the date of trial.59  
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial court and held 
that the date of trial was the correct date of valuation.60 Relying on 
precedent, the court reasoned that “an inverse condemnation action 
is based on Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 15, and is to be treated as an 
eminent domain proceeding, conducted strictly according to the 
procedures set out in [Colorado’s] eminent domain statute . . . .”61 
The applicable statute in Hayden states that the date of valuation is 
the date that the petitioner is authorized by agreement to take 
possession of the property, or “the date of trial or hearing to assess 
compensation, whichever is earlier.”62 The court reasoned that since 
there was no agreement for a permanent easement, the trial court 
was correct in finding that the date of trial was the correct date of 
valuation.63 
2. Looking at the fault of the parties 
The second rationale that some states use for establishing the 
date of trial as the date of valuation is fault based. 64 States that look 
to fault when determining a date of valuation vary on which party 
they look to for fault. However, there are two main approaches: 
courts will either look to see if the property owner is not at fault for 
                                                                                                           
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id.  
 60.  Id. at 834. 
 61.  Id. at 833–34 (emphasis added). 
 62.  Id. at 834. The statute may have been amended since then, but it reads substantially 
the same. It is interesting to note that the plain language of the statute seems to show that the 
legislature had intended the statute to apply only to direct condemnation proceedings, since 
the statute references the petitioner taking possession, which clearly implies the condemnor and 
not the condemnee. Despite the plain language, the court still held that the statute applies to 
inverse condemnation proceedings. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-114(2)(a) (1973). 
 63. Hayden, 580 P.2d at 834. 
 64.  See, e.g., Mehl v. People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 532 P.2d 489, 495 (Cal. 
1975); Williams v. Henderson Cnty. Levee Dist. No. 3, 59 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. Comm’n 
App. 1933) (finding that when a condemnor took property without complying with the law, 
“it was proper for the trial court to estimate the value of the land taken or damaged as of the 
date of the trial.”). 
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the delay in seeking his or her remedy,65 or courts will look to the 
fault of the condemnor.66  
In Mehl v. People ex rel. Department of Public Works, the trial 
court found that the state’s construction of a freeway right next to 
the Mehl’s property was a taking.67 The trial court established that 
the date of trial, 1971, was to be the date of valuation, even though 
construction of the culvert, which constituted the taking, was 
completed in 1965.68 The state appealed.69 
The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision 
to use the date of trial as the date of valuation.70 The court reasoned 
that “if the landowner is not at fault in failing to promptly pursue his 
remedy in inverse condemnation, he should enjoy the benefit of any 
increase in the value of his land at the time of trial.”71 The court 
deferred to the trial court’s findings that the property owners were 
not at fault for the delay in the proceedings and held that “it was not 
erroneous to evaluate the property as of the time of trial.”72  
3. Using the date of the “lawful” taking 
The third rationale that states use for establishing the time of 
trial as the date of valuation in inverse condemnation actions is that 
property must be lawfully taken in order to establish compensation.73 
                                                                                                           
 65.  See Mehl, 532 P.2d at 495. 
 66.  Anderson v. Port of Seattle, 304 P.2d 705, 707–08 (Wash. 1956). The court found 
that when the condemnor takes property in “advance of condemnation proceedings, [the 
condemnor] cannot insist that the compensation awarded in the condemnation proceedings be 
fixed as of the date of the unlawful entry.” Id. 
 67.  Mehl, 532 P.2d at 491–92. 
 68.  Id. at 491–92, 494. 
 69.   Id. at 491. 
 70.  Id. at 495. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id.; see also Mt. San Jacinto Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Super. Ct., 117 Cal. App. 4th 98, 
105 (2004). The court found that even though the established rule for determining the date of 
valuation in inverse condemnation actions is the date of entry, “where the property has 
increased in value after the time of the invasion, . . . a later valuation date applies, provided the 
property owner is not at fault or ‘culpable’ for failing to diligently pursue its available 
remedies.” 
 73.  See, e.g., Gully v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 774 F.2d 1287, 1291–92 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(finding that because Texas has indicated that the date of taking is the date that the 
condemnor lawfully takes possession, “value of the property condemned was correctly 
computed as of [the trial] date”); Bartz v. Bd. of Supervisors, 379 S.E.2d 356, 359 (Va. 1989) 
(finding that a taking does not occur until legal title passes to the condemnor); White v. 
Highway Comm’r, 114 S.E.2d 614, 616 (Va. 1960), superseded by statute as recognized in 
Bartz, 279 S.E.2d 356; W. Va. Dep’t of Highways v. Roda, 352 S.E.2d 134, 139 (W. Va. 
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These courts reason that property is not lawfully taken until, among 
other things, court proceedings have been initiated.74 
This approach was demonstrated in White. In that case, a 
corporation conveyed two lots to Virginia’s state highway 
commissioner (“the Commissioner”) in order to build a highway.75 
However, this corporation did not own the lots, Ms. White and Ms. 
Jacox (the “Plaintiffs”) did.76 The Plaintiffs did not discover that a 
highway had been built on their property until fourteen years later.77 
Upon discovering that a highway had been built on their property, 
the Plaintiffs went to the Commissioner, but the parties were unable 
to agree on the value of the property.78 The Commissioner then filed 
a condemnation proceeding, and the lower court found that the date 
the property should have been valued at was 1943, the date that the 
Commissioner took physical possession of the property.79 The 
Virginia Supreme Court found that “the entry of the Commissioner 
on their land in 1943 was unauthorized and unlawful.”80 The court 
then held that: 
the time of taking, with reference to which compensation is to be 
made, means the time at which the property is taken lawfully by 
appropriate legal proceedings. Conversely, it does not mean the 
time at which the property is taken unlawfully and without legal 
authority, as was done in this instance.81 
Therefore, the court held that the Plaintiffs’ property was not 
taken until it was lawfully taken some fourteen years later. 
                                                                                                           
1986) (holding that “the date of take for the purpose of determining the fair market value of 
property for the fixing of compensation . . . is the date on which the property is lawfully taken 
by the commencement of appropriate legal proceedings”); Koerber v. New Orleans, 84 So. 2d 
454, 458 (La. 1955) (finding that the date of valuation is the date that the property was taken 
lawfully). 
 74.  See generally Gully, 774 F.2d at 1291–92; Koerber, 84 So.2d at 459; Bartz, 379 
S.E.2d at 359; White, 114 S.E.2d at 616; W. Va. Dep’t of Highways, 352 S.E.2d at 139. 
 75.  White, 114 S.E.2d at 615. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. The improper conveyance was granted in 1946, but the Plaintiffs did not 
discover that the road had been built on their property until 1957. Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 616. 
 80. Id. 
 81.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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4. Using the date of trial as the date of valuation is not just in inverse 
condemnation actions 
Using the date of trial as the date of valuation in inverse 
condemnation actions encourages both parties to “game the 
system.” In a rising real estate market, this method encourages 
property owners to delay as long as possible before filing their 
inverse condemnation claim.82 On the other hand, in a declining real 
estate market, this method encourages the government to take 
property early and to “drag out negotiations in the hope of a 
favorable moment to demand condemnation.”83 It is clear that in 
either situation, “just compensation” as required by the constitution 
is not met.  
Because in inverse condemnation actions the date of physical 
taking always precedes the legal proceeding, using the date of trial as 
the date of valuation in inverse condemnation actions is 
inappropriate.84 It is inappropriate because it renders unjust results, 
and it allows parties to strategically abuse the court system.  
 a. Using a direct-condemnation-date-of-valuation statute in 
inverse condemnation actions is irrational. A direct-condemnation-
date-of-valuation statute does not contemplate the unique problems 
that inverse condemnation actions present. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court addressed this very issue in Maxey v. Redevelopment Authority 
of Racine.85 The Maxey court had to determine what date of 
valuation to use when determining the value of property in an 
inverse condemnation action.86 The court recognized that there was 
                                                                                                           
 82.  See Calmat of Ariz. v. State ex rel. Miller, 859 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Ariz. 1993); see also 
Dep’t of Transp. v. Shaw, 345 N.E.2d 153, 162 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 369 N.E.2d 884 (Ill. 1977). The court found that a date of valuation set as the date of 
trial was appropriate because a “property owner can bring [an inverse condemnation] action 
within the period of the statue of limitations” and it allows the “owner some leeway to 
determine when he shall seek redress for wrongs or unauthorized acts allegedly committed.” 
Id. This reasoning was rejected on appeal when the Illinois Supreme Court held that the date 
of valuation was “the date of the physical closing of [the] road.” Shaw, 369 N.E.2d at 888. 
 83.  Anchorage v. Nesbett, 530 P.2d 1324, 1335 (Alaska 1975) (quoting State Highway 
Comm’n v. Stumbo, 352 P.2d 478, 483 (Or. 1960). See United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 
21–22 (1958) (finding that in cases where the government enters into possession of property 
prior to filing a claim, it is inappropriate to consider the time of filing as the time of taking 
because the government can reduce the amount of money it would have to pay to the 
landowner simply by not filing suit until the market is more favorable for the government). 
 84.  See, e.g., Maxey v. Redevelopment Auth. of Racine, 288 N.W.2d 794, 804 (Wis. 
1980). 
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a statute that fixed the date of valuation in a direct condemnation 
action, but found that “[t]hose portions of the eminent domain 
statutes which arguably could lead to the conclusion that a different 
date [other than the date of taking] should be used . . . not only 
make no sense in the case of an inverse condemnation but also, as a 
matter of legislative intent, are of doubtful applicability.”87 The court 
reasoned that the statutes did not apply to inverse condemnation 
actions because, unlike direct condemnation actions where the date 
of taking is contemporaneous with the legal action, the date of 
taking in inverse condemnation actions precedes the legal action.88 
The court also reasoned that because property values fluctuate, a 
date of valuation that comes later than the date of taking would 
either unfairly enrich or unfairly penalize the property owner.89  
Several other courts have followed this reasoning.90 The Hayden 
court was correct in pointing out that the principles of “just 
compensation” apply to inverse condemnation as well as direct 
condemnation actions.91 However, the Hayden court was wrong 
                                                                                                           
 85.  See id. Other courts have chosen to ignore date-of-valuation statutes when they 
render unjust results. Cnty. of Dona Ana v. Bennett, 867 P.2d 1160, 1164–65 (N.M. 1994) 
(finding that the state’s date-of-valuation statute was inapplicable because it would provide 
inadequate compensation for the landowner); Utah State Rd. Comm’n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 
821, 828–30 (Utah 1984) (finding that because the state’s date-of-valuation statute, as applied 
to Friberg’s facts, did not constitute just compensation, it was inapplicable). 
 86.  Maxey, 288 N.W.2d at 804. 
 87.  Id. at 805. 
 88.  Id. at 804 (“[I]n an inverse condemnation, the date of taking, by definition, is 
required to antedate the commencement of the proceedings and is a jurisdictional prerequisite 
of the inverse condemnation action.”). 
 89.  Id. (“A valuation on the date of filing, if it is to coincide with the commencement of 
the action, would therefore unjustly enrich the property owner if the value of the property 
appreciated following the taking, or in the usual case, would unfairly penalize him if the 
property’s value were diminishing as a result of condemnation blight.”). 
 90.  See Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. St. John’s Water Control Dist., 981 So. 2d 605, 606 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (“[I]n an inverse condemnation proceeding, the date of valuation 
for compensation is the date that the property was wrongfully appropriated by the condemning 
agency.”); Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v. Wright, 232 So. 2d 709, 714 (Miss. 1970) 
(“[F]luctuations in the general economy[or] changes in the character of the neighborhood . . . 
are factors capable, at least, of materially altering market values and, consequently, of affecting 
the amount due as compensation.”); Rose v. City of Lincoln, 449 N.W.2d 522, 527 (Neb. 
1989) (quoting Dep’t of Transp. v. Shaw, 345 N.E.2d 153, 161 (Ill. App. 1976) 
(“[V]aluation at the date of filing might have the effect of unjustly enriching the property 
owner . . . or of unfairly penalizing him, if property rights were depreciating.”)); Hurley v. 
State, 134 N.W.2d 782, 784–85 (S.D. 1965) ( “[T]he correct date or time that compensation 
is to be ascertained is the date of the taking or damaging . . . .”). 
 91.  Hayden v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 580 P.2d 830, 834 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/21/2011  12:13 PM 
2315 Inverse Condemnation Actions Present Unique Problems 
 2329 
when it strictly applied a direct-condemnation-date-of-valuation 
statute that set the date of valuation at the date of trial.92 The 
Hayden court was wrong because using the date of trial as the date 
of valuation in the inverse condemnation action, even when there 
was a statute directing the court to do so, was inappropriate because 
it rendered unjust results. The results were unjust because the 
condemnor had “taken” the land much earlier. 
  b. Fault should not be a factor when determining the date of 
valuation. Considering fault or bad faith either on the part of the 
condemnor or, the lack of fault by the condemnee, should not be a 
factor when determining property value. Fault should not be 
considered because, even when a condemnor takes in bad faith, the 
condemnee bears some fault in any delay in bringing an action to 
court. At least one court has recognized that a property owner who 
fails to assert his rights is as much at fault as the wrongful 
trespasser.93 The property owner in Mehl was not being a responsible 
landowner and should have born some fault for waiting six years to 
bring an inverse condemnation action.94  
Additionally, just compensation requires that the property owner 
be put in the same monetary position as he would be in if his 
property had not been taken.95 The only logical reason that a court 
would want to look at fault or bad faith would be to deter others 
from that behavior. Damages in this sense can be seen as punitive, 
and punitive damages are prohibited in eminent domain cases.96 
Therefore, using a later valuation date based on the fault, or lack 
thereof, of either party is inappropriate when determining the date of 
valuation.  
                                                                                                           
 92.  Id. 
 93.  State Highway Comm’n v. Stumbo, 352 P.2d 478, 483 (Or. 1960) (finding that a 
property owner who fails “to assert his rights seasonably when the law gives him ample 
remedy, is hardly less at fault than the trespasser”). 
 94.  Mehl v. People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 532 P.2d 489 (Cal. 1975). 
 95.  See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 
473–74 (1973) (finding that just compensation requires that the property owner be “put in 
the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken”).  
 96.  See, e.g., Clemmer v. Rowan Water, Inc., No 0:04CV165(HRW), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6965, at *10–17 (finding that a property owner could not seek punitive damages in an 
inverse condemnation action because “punitive damage claims are precluded by the doctrine of 
reverse condemnation”). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/21/2011  12:13 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
2330 
  c. Using the date of lawful taking as the date of valuation—in 
inverse condemnation actions—is completely inappropriate. Even 
though this rationale looks to the date of taking as the date of 
valuation, it is still inappropriate because it does not recognize that 
property might actually be taken much earlier. Using the date of trial 
for the date of valuation because the taking is not lawful until trial 
may be appropriate in a direct condemnation action; however, it is 
inappropriate in an inverse condemnation action. It is inappropriate 
in an inverse condemnation action because the taking in an inverse 
condemnation action—by definition—occurs before the 
proceeding.97 And by following this reasoning, courts are per se not 
allowing inverse condemnation. In a declining real estate market, this 
reasoning only encourages condemnors to take early because they 
know that by the time the action goes to court the property would 
be worth significantly less.  
C. Using the Date that the Condemnor Substantially Affected the 
Condemnee’s Use and Enjoyment of His Property as the Date of 
Valuation 
New Jersey’s date-of-valuation statute contemplates inverse 
condemnation actions.98 The statute provides that the date of 
valuation is determined at the “earliest” of four options: (1) the date 
that the condemnor possess the property “in whole or in part”; (2) 
the date that the condemnation proceeding commences; (3) the date 
that the condemnor acts in a way which “substantially affects the use 
and enjoyment of the property by the condemnee”; or (4) “the date 
of a declaration of blight by the governing body.”99 While this 
statute does not specifically mention “inverse condemnation 
actions,” it is clear that options (1) and (3) contemplate inverse 
condemnation actions.  
New Jersey’s first option is the “date of physical occupation or 
trespass” rationale that most jurisdictions use.100 New Jersey’s second 
                                                                                                           
 97.  First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 
304, 316 (1987) (“While the typical taking occurs when the government acts to condemn 
property in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, the entire doctrine of inverse 
condemnation is predicated on the proposition that a taking may occur without such formal 
proceedings.”).  
 98.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3–30 (West 2009).  
 99.  Id. Option (4) has some abandonment requirements that are inapplicable to inverse 
condemnation actions. Id. 
 100.  See supra Part II.A. 
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option is the date of trial.101 New Jersey’s third option allows the 
property to be valued on the date that the condemnor “substantially 
affect[ed] the use and enjoyment of the property.”102 By requiring a 
court to use the “earliest” of the four date of valuation options, New 
Jersey is attempting to solve some of the date-of-valuation problems 
that inverse condemnation actions create. New Jersey attempts to 
solve these problems by setting the date of valuation close to the 
date of taking. However, New Jersey’s statute creates perverse 
incentives and gives unjust compensation.  
1. New Jersey’s “substantially affected” test 
The “substantially affected” test allows a court to value property 
from the time government action “substantially affects the [property 
owner’s] use and enjoyment of his property.103 In Township of West 
Windsor v. Nierenberg, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that “a 
letter written by a municipality to a potential condemnee 
‘substantially affect[ed]’ the value of the property, thereby setting 
the valuation date pursuant to N.J.S.A. 20:3–30(c).”104 The property 
owners in Township of West Windsor formed Princeton Manor 
Associates (“PMA”) in 1987.105 PMA’s purpose was to develop 
property that it had purchased from the Nierenbergs.106 However, 
“some time prior to 1987, the property . . . was designated on the 
Township’s Master Plan as a potential site for West Windsor’s 
proposed Community Park.”107 PMA submitted a subdivision plan 
and application “to the Township on May 13, 1988.”108 Over the 
next month, PMA received two letters dealing with potential 
problems with their application.109 The second letter stated that 
PMA’s property was not entirely served by public sewers and that 
“percolation tests and soil log data for the property would be 
required before the application would be considered further.”110 
                                                                                                           
 101.  See supra Part II.B. 
 102.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3–30. 
 103.  See id.; Twp. of W. Windsor v. Nierenberg, 695 A.2d 1344 (N.J. 1997).  
 104.  695 A.2d at 1346, 1358 (emphasis added). 
 105.  Id. at 1346. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. The plan was in compliance of the specific zoning that applied to PMA’s 
property. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
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PMA had to decide to either wait seven months and perform a 
percolation test that cost $40,000, or “attempt to have the 
municipal sewer plan amended to provide service to the entire 
property.”111 However, while PMA was studying their options, they 
received a letter from the Township Administrator.112 The letter was 
to serve as “formal notification that West Windosr [sic] Township 
may acquire [the] property for the purpose of establishing a 
Community Park.”113 The letter also informed PMA that the 
Township of West Windsor (the “Township”) had already received 
part of the funding it needed and had applied for a low-interest 
loan.114 After receiving the letter, PMA’s counsel advised PMA “that 
they could not secure Township approval for enlargement of the 
sewer system when the Township appeared intent on condemning 
the property.”115 Six months later, PMA’s counsel wrote a letter to 
the Township informing them that PMA had “found it 
impossible . . . to proceed with the development plans previously 
filed.”116 He also informed the Township that PMA still had “not 
even received an appraisal or any form of offer.”117 The Township 
responded that they were still in the process of determining the value 
and would inform PMA when they could begin negotiating.118 
After two years of negotiating, PMA filed an inverse 
condemnation suit “seeking . . . just compensation for the 
Township’s alleged destruction of the value of its property.”119 
However, negotiations between PMA and the Township continued 
until PMA rejected several offers.  
After several experts testified concerning whether or not the July 
1988 letter substantially affected PMA’s use and enjoyment of the 
property, the trial court concluded that it did and determined the 
property should be valued as of the July 1988 letter.120 The trial 
                                                                                                           
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 1346–47. 
 113.  Id. at 1347. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 1348. 
 120.  Id. The court found that even though the letter said that the Township “may” 
acquire PMA’s property, “the word ‘may’ is so overwhelmed by the other aspects of the letter” 
that PMA was justified in concluding that the Township was going to acquire the property. Id. 
at 1349–50. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/21/2011  12:13 PM 
2315 Inverse Condemnation Actions Present Unique Problems 
 2333 
court “reasoned that the Township’s letter impeded development, 
thereby significantly diminishing the possibility that the land would 
be put to its highest and best use as a residential development.”121  
On appeal, the court held that “the letter did not substantially 
affect [PMA’s] use and enjoyment of the property”122 and that PMA 
could have continued with the subdivision process, which would 
have forced “the Township to determine its acquisition plans.”123 
The appellate court recognized that PMA “would have incurred 
significant expenses” in continuing with the subdivision process, but 
the court indicated that these expenses were business risks.124 The 
New Jersey Supreme Court overturned the appellate court and 
reasoned that the Township’s letter did substantially affect PMA’s 
use and enjoyment of the property.125 
2. Using the “substantially affected” test for determining the date of 
valuation renders unjust results. 
Determining the date of valuation using the “substantially 
affected” test renders unjust results for both condemnors and 
condemnees.126 Property values fluctuate, and this test creates 
perverse incentives for either party to attempt to obtain a favorable 
date of valuation. This test also allows for valuation dates to precede 
the date of taking. 
As discussed earlier, property values can increase or decrease 
depending on market conditions.127 The majority in Township of West 
                                                                                                           
 121.  Id. at 1350. 
 122.  Id. at 1351. The court reasoned that the letter did not promise that the Township 
would condemn, but only that it might. It also reasoned that PMA knew, before it purchased 
the property, that the Township had already listed the property as a potential site for a 
community park. See id. 
 123. Id.  
 124.  Id.  
 125.  Id. at 1357. The New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that even though PMA could 
have continued its attempts to develop, the Township’s letter had substantially affected PMA’s 
use and enjoyment of the property because PMA thought that any attempts “would have been 
futile.” Id. 
 126.  The substantially affected test can also promote secrecy. The dissent in Township of 
West Windsor noted that the majority’s decision “discourages municipalities from informing 
property owners about possible plans to acquire their property.” Id. at 1363 (O’hern, J., 
dissenting). This test promotes secrecy because property values may already be going down, 
and developers like PMA may not be able to get subdivision approval. As such, why should 
municipalities give property owners a windfall by announcing potential plans that may or may 
not actually happen? 
 127.  See supra Part I.  
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Windsor thought that the “substantially affected” test would protect 
both condemnors and condemnees.128 However, this test can create 
perverse incentives for either party to attempt to obtain a favorable 
date of valuation and, depending on what the real estate market is 
doing, to drag out negotiations.  
The “substantially affected” test used in combination with the 
principle that a condemnor can inform a property owner of intent to 
condemn and later abandon those condemnation proceedings denies 
just compensation to condemnees.129 Consider the following 
hypothetical: The town of Greenville wants to build a park and has 
three sites to choose from. Property values in the area are 
dramatically increasing, so Greenville decides to send intent-to-
condemn letters to all three properties effectively “freezing the date 
of valuation” as the date of the letter. Greenville can then go 
through the process of determining which property it will actually 
condemn. After making its decision, Greenville can then inform the 
property owners at the other two sites of its intent to abandon the 
condemnation proceedings. In a rising real estate market, Greenville 
gets the benefit of an early valuation date.  
The “substantially affected” test can also unjustly enrich property 
owners. Township of West Windsor is a great example of how a 
property owner can be unjustly enriched. In Township of West 
Windsor, PMA purchased property that it knew was a potential site 
for a park.130 PMA attempted to get approval for subdivision, but the 
Township denied the application.131 PMA then received a letter from 
the Township informing the developer that the Township may 
condemn the property.132 PMA then decided not to spend the extra 
money it would take to attempt to get approval to subdivide.133 By 
holding that the date of valuation should be the date of the letter of 
intent, the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed PMA to get the 
                                                                                                           
 128.  695 A.2d at 1358 (finding that “[c]ondemnors are not prejudiced by [the 
substantially affected test] and, in fact, may benefit from its application in instances where 
governmental action precipitates a substantial increase in the value of the subject property”).  
 129.  See Thompson v. Tualatin Hills Park & Recreation Dist., 496 F. Supp. 530 (D. Or. 
1980) (finding that the government could abandon a condemnation proceeding without there 
being a taking in a case where a property owner had an option to purchase a right of way 
which he later declined due to the condemnation proceeding). 
 130.  695 A.2d at 1351. 
 131. Id. at 1346. 
 132.  Id at 1347.  
 133.  Id.  
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benefit of an early date of valuation in a declining market.134 PMA 
received this benefit without any showing that it would have gotten 
approval to subdivide in the absence of condemnation.135 Applying 
the “substantially affected” test created perverse incentives for PMA 
to “sit” on the property without any business risk and get the benefit 
of a larger compensation award. 
Applying the “substantially affected” test allows for the date of 
valuation to precede the taking.136 The Utah Supreme Court stated 
that using a date of valuation that precedes the actual taking may not 
“reflect a fair valuation of the property and [may] not therefore 
constitute ‘just compensation.’”137 This is especially true when the 
court uses the “substantially affected” test in an inverse 
condemnation action. In an inverse condemnation action, “the 
property owner is ‘required to show that there has been substantial 
destruction of the value of [his or her] property and that [the taking 
party’s] activities have been a substantial factor in bringing this 
about.’”138 Because plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his property 
would be substantially affected before there was a substantial 
destruction of the value of his property, the property would be 
valued at a time before the law recognizes that the property has even 
been taken.  
D. The Method for Determining Date of Valuation Should be the Date 
of Physical Occupation/Trespass or Date that Condemnor’s Interference 
Became a Taking. 
Just compensation begins with determining a proper date of 
valuation. Taken property should be valued at the time that the 
property is taken.139 It is clear that the most unjust results happen 
when courts use a date of valuation that is different than the date of 
                                                                                                           
 134.  See id. at 1358. 
 135.  Id. at 1357. 
 136.  See id. at 1356–57.  
 137.  Utah State Rd. Comm’n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 829 (Utah 1984) (finding that 
“[w]hen valuation is fixed at a date prior to the actual taking and the value of the property 
increases during a prolonged condemnation proceeding . . . the valuation does not reflect a fair 
valuation of the property and does not therefore constitute ‘just compensation . . . .’”). 
 138.  Twp. of W. Windsor, 695 A.2d at 1356 (first alteration in original) (quoting Wash. 
Mkt. Enters. v. City of Trenton, 343 A.2d 408, 416 (N.J. 1975)). 
 139.  United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 22 (1958) (finding that the “event which gives 
rise to the claim for compensation” is to be the date of valuation). 
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taking. As discussed earlier, there are problems with the various 
approaches courts use when determining a valuation date.  
The method of valuing the property at the date of possession or 
trespass does not help a court determine a date of valuation when 
there is no physical trespass or possession. In addition, using the date 
of possession or trespass might encourage condemnors to act in bad 
faith.  
The method of using the date of trial also has many problems. 
When the date of valuation is the date of trial, it allows for unjust 
results because property values can fluctuate greatly if the date of the 
actual taking and the date of trial are separated by a large amount of 
time. It is unjust when property is valued either higher or lower than 
its value at the time of taking. Depending on the situation, this 
method is unjust to either the condemnor or the condemnee.  
Some courts use the date of trial as the date of valuation because 
they want to give the property owner greater compensation. This 
reasoning is very shortsighted because these courts are creating rules 
that, depending on the real estate market, do not always benefit the 
property owners. Other courts have reasoned that since one party 
was more at fault, they should bear the financial burden. This 
reasoning is effectively awarding punitive damages, which is 
inappropriate when determining just compensation.140  
Using the date that the condemnor “substantially affected” the 
condemnee’s use and enjoyment of the property as the date of 
valuation is improper because it creates perverse incentives for both 
parties. In rising markets, condemnors will prematurely inform 
property owners of intent to take, thus substantially affecting the 
property owner’s use and enjoyment, and freezing the date of 
valuation. In declining markets, the property owner will try to show 
that he was substantially affected from the earliest possible date. This 
method also allows for the date of valuation to precede the date of 
taking.  
A proper date of valuation should not only be just, it should also 
be consistent. A consistent method for determining the date of 
valuation will encourage parties to settle out of court because both 
parties will know, from the outset, which date of valuation is used by 
                                                                                                           
 140.  A party could bring a claim that is related to their taking claim and ask for punitive 
damages, but punitive damages should not be contemplated in the just compensation 
requirement of the Fifth Amendment. Clemmer v. Rowan Water, Inc., No 
0:04CV165(HRW), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6965, at *16 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 23, 2006). 
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the court.141 The Stumbo court recognized the benefit of a consistent 
method for determining the date of valuation. The court reasoned 
that when there is a consistent method for determining the valuation 
date “[t]here will be no motive on either side to drag out 
negotiations in the hope of a favorable moment to demand 
condemnation.”142 
A proper date of valuation statute should be the earlier of the 
date of physical occupation or trespass, or the date the potential 
condemnor’s interference became a taking. This method is just to 
both the condemnor and the condemnee because the date of 
valuation will be the date of the actual taking. When the date of 
valuation is the date of taking, courts do not have to worry about 
depreciating or appreciating land values. 
Where there is a physical possession or trespass, the court should 
use the date of the possession or trespass as the date of valuation 
because that is the date of taking. This is the majority rule followed 
by the United States Supreme Court and several states.143 
Where there is no actual possession or trespass, the court should 
use the date that the government interference became a taking. This 
method fills any gaps that using the date of physical occupation or 
trespass leaves. Using the date that the condemnee’s interference 
becomes a taking will be used in the second and third types of 
inverse condemnation cases. 
In the second type of inverse condemnation actions, where the 
property owner is compensated for part of his land that has been 
taken, but brings an action alleging damages to the land that has not 
                                                                                                           
 141.  See Bauer, supra note 1, at 282 (stating that “[v]aluation date statutes also attempt 
to provide consistency and predictability. With a clearly established valuation date, the triers of 
fact and the parties to condemnation actions can determine the appropriate valuation date and 
develop reasonable expectations about the required evidence and the ultimate result. Also, 
condemnors will know in advance of a condemnation action how the property will be valued, 
and knowing this information may affect the decision to take the property.”). 
 142.  State Highway Comm’n v. Stumbo, 352 P.2d 478, 483 (Or. 1960).  
 143.  First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 
304, 320 n.10 (1987); City of Anchorage v. Nesbett, 530 P.2d 1324, 1335 (Alaska 1975); 
Calmat of Ariz. v. State ex rel. Miller, 859 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc); Fla. Dep’t 
of Transp. v. St. John’s Water Control Dist., 981 So. 2d 605, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); 
Hulsey v. Dep’t of Transp., 498 S.E.2d 122, 126 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); Tibbs v. City of 
Sandpoint, 603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Idaho 1979); Adams v. Parish, 978 So. 2d 1202, 1208 (La. 
Ct. App. 2008); Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v. Wright, 232 So. 2d 709, 715 (Miss. 1970); 
Rose v. City of Lincoln, 449 N.W.2d 522, 527 (Neb. 1989); Hurley v. State, 134 N.W.2d 
782, 784 (S.D. 1965). 
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been condemned,144 the date of valuation would be the date that the 
condemnor’s actions became a taking. Depending on the particular 
circumstances, the second type of inverse condemnation actions will 
have one of two different valuation dates: (1) the date that the 
original piece property was “taken,” or (2) the date that the 
condemnor’s interference became a “taking.” 
In the third type of inverse condemnation actions, where the 
condemnor does not formally or physically take any land but the 
condemnor interferes with the property owner’s “bundle of rights” 
to a degree that constitutes a taking,145 the date of valuation will be 
the date the court determines that the interference became a taking. 
Determining the date that the government’s interference became a 
taking could be a comment in and of itself. However, a court could 
use the ripeness test discussed in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island. In 
Palazzolo, the United States Supreme Court determined that 
generally a party cannot bring a regulatory taking claim until it is 
ripe.146 The Court discussed how a takings claim “is not ripe unless 
‘the government entity charged with implementing the regulation[ ] 
has reached a final decision.’”147 The Palazzolo court went on to 
reason “once it becomes clear that the agency lacks the discretion to 
permit any development . . . a takings claim is likely to have 
ripened.”148 
While Palazzolo involved an agency regulation, the same 
reasoning could be used for any other regulatory taking. Under the 
ripeness test there are two possible dates of taking. If an ordinance, 
regulation, or statute is passed that allows for exceptions, then the 
date of taking is the date that the agency, city council, or whatever 
group is responsible for approving or disapproving the exception 
makes a final decision. If the ordinance, regulation, or statute does 
not allow for exceptions then the date that the ordinance, regulation, 
or statute took effect would be the date of taking. 
When courts are faced with a situation where there is a statute 
that sets the date of valuation as the date of trial, they should do 
what Wisconsin did in Maxey and find that the statute does not apply 
                                                                                                           
 144.  See Dep’t of Transp. v. Shaw, 345 N.E.2d 153, 160 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 369 N.E.2d 884 (Ill. 1977). 
 145.  See Bauer, supra note 1, at 273. 
 146.  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618 (2001).  
 147.  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. 
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985)). 
 148.  Id. at 620. 
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to inverse condemnation actions because it is irrational.149 This 
reasoning has also been followed in other jurisdictions.150  
One problem with the suggested method for determining the 
date of valuation is that it does not deter the condemnor from acting 
in bad faith. One way to deter bad faith is through punitive damages; 
however, as discussed above, punitive damages should have no place 
when determining just compensation.151 However, as discussed 
below, awarding interest can substantially increase a compensation 
award and might deter some condemnors from acting in bad faith.  
III. DETERMINING THE DATE AT WHICH INTEREST BEGINS TO 
ACCRUE 
The date that the court determines that interest should accrue 
(the “date of interest”) is also very important when determining just 
compensation in inverse condemnation actions. The Supreme Court 
of the United States found that adding interest to property value is a 
part of just compensation “as required by the Fifth Amendment.”152 
Just like determining the date of valuation, courts use various dates 
to determine the date of interest.153 Courts should set the date of 
interest as the date of taking. If this Comment’s suggestions are 
used, then the date of taking, date of valuation, and the date of 
interest will all be the same date.  
                                                                                                           
 149.  Maxey v. Redevelopment Auth. of Racine, 288 N.W.2d 794, 805 (Wis. 1980) 
(deciding not to follow a statute that would have required a valuation date that was much later 
than the date of taking). 
 150.  See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Kelso Corp., 380 A.2d 216 (Md. 1977). 
 151.  See supra note 140. 
 152.  Albrecht v. United States, 329 U.S. 599, 603 (1947) (finding that “the reasoning 
on which interest is added to value as a part of ‘just compensation’ in court condemnation 
proceedings is . . . that when a court determines just compensation, it first fixes bare value at 
the time of the taking and adds a sum to compensate for deferred payment of bare value so as 
to make the property owner whole as required by the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 153.  Calmat of Ariz. v. State ex rel. Miller, 859 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc) 
(interest awarded from the date of entry); Mehl v. People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 532 
P.2d 489, 495 (Cal. 1975) (interest awarded from the date the condemnation is appreciable); 
Cnty. of Clark v. Alper, 685 P.2d 943, 950 (Nev. 1984) (interest awarded from the time of 
taking); Bartz v. Bd. of Supervisors, 379 S.E.2d 356, 360 (Va. 1989) (no interest on a 
compensation award that is timely paid). 
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A. Courts That Use the Date of Trial as the Date of Valuation Use 
Different Dates of Interest 
This Comment discussed the three rationales that courts use 
when they determine that the date of valuation is the date of trial. 
These rationales consist of: following an eminent domain statute, 
looking at fault, and looking to when a lawful taking happens. 
However, not surprisingly, these same courts have established 
different dates of interest.  
1. Some courts have found that the date of interest should be the time of 
taking 
In County of Clark v. Alper, the Nevada Supreme Court 
determined that the date of valuation was the date of trial.154 The 
court found that the date of interest should be different than the 
date of valuation and held that the date of interest should be the 
date of possession—a date earlier than the date of trial.155  
The court rejected the county’s argument that giving the 
property owners the benefit of a later valuation date and an earlier 
date of interest constituted double recovery.156 The court found that 
“[a]lthough the landowner has been benefited by the time of trial 
valuation, he or she has still been deprived of the use of the proceeds 
that should have been paid at the time of the taking.”157 The court 
reasoned that “[t]he intent of the legislature by enacting [the date of 
valuation statute] was . . . to force the government to bring a 
condemnation action to trial.”158 The court seemed to be indicating 
that by giving the property owners the benefit of a later valuation 
date and an earlier date of interest, it was punishing the condemnor 
for not bringing the action to trial. 
                                                                                                           
 154.  685 P.2d at 949 (finding that “[i]nverse condemnation proceedings are the 
constitutional equivalent to eminent domain actions and are governed by the same rules and 
principles that are applied to formal condemnation proceedings”). 
 155.  Id. at 949–50. 
 156.  Id. at 949. The county argued that since the property had appreciated between the 
time of taking and the time of trial, the property owners were already compensated for the 
time between the taking and compensation. Id. 
 157.  Id. at 950. The court went on to say that “[s]uch an award is proper 
notwithstanding the fact that the value of the property was fixed as of the date of trial and the 
fact that the property’s value at the time of trial was more than its value at the time of the 
taking.” Id. 
 158.  Id.  
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This approach is inappropriate for a couple of reasons. First, it 
unjustly compensates the property owner by giving him a double 
benefit. And second, using this rule as a way to punish a condemnor 
for not bringing an action in court is inappropriate because this rule 
does not contemplate the different kinds of inverse condemnation 
proceedings. 
A double benefit is what can happen when a court applies a date 
of valuation statute that was meant for direct condemnation actions 
to an inverse condemnation action. There would have been no 
problem in applying the date-of-valuation statute in Alper with date 
of interest if Alper had been a direct condemnation action. In a 
direct condemnation action, the taking does not occur until trial. 
Therefore, in a direct condemnation action the date of taking, the 
date of trial, and the date of interest are all on or around the same 
time. This is what the statute in Alper contemplated. It does not 
work in inverse condemnation actions.  
By relying on its interpretation of the intent of the legislature—
that the date of valuation statute is the legislature’s way of trying to 
force the condemnor to bring direct condemnation actions—the 
Alper court did not foresee the situations where the condemnor does 
not think that it is “taking” anything. As discussed earlier in this 
Comment, there are a few different types of inverse condemnation 
actions.159 Inverse condemnation actions can consist of regulatory 
takings.160 Regulatory takings can be very hard for property owners 
to prove, and condemnors would be justified in assuming, in the 
majority of cases, that there was not a taking.161 Awarding a later 
valuation date and an earlier valuation date—in an attempt to force 
condemnors to use their taking power—is wholly inappropriate in 
inverse condemnation actions involving regulatory takings. 
2. Some courts have found that the date of interest should be the date 
that the landowner became aware of the taking 
In Mehl, the California Supreme Court held that the date of 
valuation was the date of trial as long as the “landowner is not at 
fault in failing to promptly pursue his remedy.”162 The Mehl court 
                                                                                                           
 159.  See supra Part II. 
 160.  See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 161.  See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).  
 162.  Mehl v. People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 532 P.2d 489, 495 (Cal. 1975).  
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found that the date of interest should be the date that the landowner 
became aware of the taking.163  
Although not as extreme as Alper, because the property owner 
was already compensated for the loss of compensation with a late 
valuation date, the Mehl method allowed for a double recovery. 
However, unlike the court in Alper, which offered reasons it was 
giving what might have seemed to be unjust, the court in Mehl gave 
no real reason why it found that the date of interest was earlier than 
the date of valuation.164 
3. Some courts have found that the date of interest should be the date of 
trial 
In Bartz v. Board of Supervisors, the Virginia Supreme Court held 
that the date of valuation was the date of trial because a “lawful” 
taking does not occur until a “compensation award [has been] paid 
and legal title passed.”165 The court, using the same reasoning, held 
that the date of interest should be the same date.166 
In application this means that a landowner is not ever entitled to 
interest because if legal title does not pass until the money has been 
paid to the landowner, then interest will not be required. This 
method of determining the date of valuation and interest is flawed in 
many ways.167 This method does not meet the requirements of “just 
compensation” that the Constitution requires. Under this approach a 
condemnor knows it can take property early without worrying about 
paying any increase in land values, since the condemnor will not be 
required to pay interest from the time that it actually “took” the 
property.  
B. Some Courts that Use the Date of Possession as the Date of Valuation 
Use the Same Date as the Date of Interest  
When a court determines that the date of valuation is the date of 
possession, it seems most appropriate to set the date of interest from 
that date also. In Calmat, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the 
                                                                                                           
 163.  Id. (finding that interest should be awarded from the date that the taking becomes 
“appreciable”).  
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Bartz v. Bd. of Supervisors, 379 S.E.2d 356, 359 (Va. 1989). 
 166.  Id.  
 167.  See supra Part II (discussing why this method for determining the date of valuation 
is inappropriate). 
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date of valuation was the date of possession.168 The court then 
determined that the property owner is entitled to interest from the 
same date.169 
Looking to an Oregon Supreme Court case, the court in Calmat 
recognized that “one weakness . . . [in] valuing the property as of 
the date of entry was that the property owner would be deprived of 
the reasonable rental value of the land for the period of the state’s 
wrongful occupation.”170 This weakness was fixed by awarding the 
property owner “interest on the property’s value measured from the 
date of entry.”171 
This approach seems to be appropriate except for the inverse 
condemnation actions (especially regulatory takings) where there is 
no possession or trespass. It is difficult to determine what date of 
interest the Calmat court would use in an inverse condemnation 
action where there was no physical possession or trespass by the 
government. The court could award interest from the date that the 
interference became a taking, or award it from the day that the court 
decided it was a taking. A clear, certain rule will encourage parties to 
settle and discourage litigation.172 
C. The Date of Interest Should Be the Same Date as the Dates of 
Taking and Valuation 
The basic principles of just compensation seem to require that 
the date of taking and the date of interest be the same date because 
interest should be required from the date that compensation is due. 
Under this Comment’s suggested method, the date of interest in 
inverse condemnation actions would begin either from the date of 
possession or trespass, or the date that the condemnor’s actions 
became a taking. Ensuring that interest begins from this date will 
also help deter potential condemnors from acting in bad faith 
because they will have to pay interest from the date that the property 
                                                                                                           
 168.  Calmat of Ariz. v. State ex rel. Miller, 859 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc). 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. (citing State Highway Comm’n v. Stumbo 352 P.2d 478, 483 (Or. 1960)). 
 171.  Id. The court also found that this reasoning “is consistent with United States 
Supreme Court’s holding in Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, where the Court held that 
a property owner is entitled to interest running from the date of the government’s entry where 
the government takes possession before ascertaining or paying compensation.” Id. (citing 
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306 (1923)).  
 172. Stumbo, 352 P.2d at 484 (citing Parks v. City of Boston, 15 Pick. 198, 208 (Mass. 
1834)). 
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was taken, and interest can substantially increase a compensation 
award. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The methods that courts currently use to determine the date of 
valuation and date of interest in inverse condemnation actions do 
not consistently provide just compensation. The method that uses 
the date of possession or trespass as the date of valuation is improper 
because it does not contemplate scenarios in which there is no 
physical possession. The methods that use the date of trial as the date 
of valuation and the date that the condemnor’s actions substantially 
affected the landowner’s use and enjoyment are improper because 
the property is not valued at the date the property was taken. 
Additionally, courts are very inconsistent when determining the date 
that interest accrues in inverse condemnation actions. The most just 
method is to set the date that interest accrues, the date of taking, 
and the date of valuation as the same date. 
Ricky J. Nelson 
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